Introduction {#section1-0011392117717294}
============

Support for populist radical right (PRR) parties and movements has swelled in previous decades ([@bibr22-0011392117717294]). This has triggered extensive scholarly debate, which often focuses on electoral politics -- for recent reviews on PRR parties, see [@bibr63-0011392117717294], [@bibr65-0011392117717294] and [@bibr107-0011392117717294].

A strict division of labour seems to divide sociologists from political scientists, with each discipline focusing on the non-electoral and electoral channel, respectively ([@bibr129-0011392117717294]). Social movement protests have generally been dominated by 'the left', while 'the right' mainly uses the electoral channel to voice its discontent, instead of taking to the street ([@bibr71-0011392117717294]). Consequently, social movement scholars focus on egalitarian movements that promote change, rather than reactionary movements ([@bibr70-0011392117717294]). They tend to overlook the most important contemporary actors mobilizing against the consequences of globalization and immigration: the populist radical right ([@bibr72-0011392117717294]). As [@bibr38-0011392117717294]: 4) put it: 'social movement studies ... \[have\] been slow to address the "bad side" of social movement activism'. Only when sociologists widen their perspective to the electoral channel, can we fully grasp the implications of globalization and large-scale immigration for political contention.

This article reviews the scholarship on both PRR parties and movements in contemporary European democracies. First, we discuss the definitional debate about what constitutes the populist radical right (PRR) family. Second, we review demand-side and supply-side explanations for the fortunes of PRR parties and movements. Third, we discuss research on the consequences of the emergence and rise of PRR parties and movements. The review concludes with a discussion of the future directions that theorizing and research could take.

Definitional debate on radical right-wing populism {#section2-0011392117717294}
==================================================

Different labels such as 'extreme right' ([@bibr18-0011392117717294]; [@bibr23-0011392117717294]; [@bibr96-0011392117717294]), 'far right' ([@bibr63-0011392117717294]: [@bibr156-0011392117717294]) and 'populist radical right' ([@bibr104-0011392117717294]) are used interchangeably to refer to the same organizations, such as the French Front National (FN), Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ) and Flemish Bloc/Flemish Interest (VB). A consensus has emerged that they constitute one single family.

The most important common denominator is their exclusionist, ethno-nationalist notion of citizenship, reflected in the slogan 'own people first' ([@bibr26-0011392117717294]; [@bibr127-0011392117717294]). This nativist stance means that states should be inhabited exclusively by members of the native group (the nation) and that non-native elements (persons and ideas) threaten homogeneous nation-states ([@bibr104-0011392117717294]). The label 'radical' thus refers to the outspoken position at the far end of the political spectrum on issues related to immigration and ethnic diversity ([@bibr7-0011392117717294]). Since they strongly hold issue-ownership over immigration issues ([@bibr2-0011392117717294]) some scholars simply refer to 'anti-immigration parties' ([@bibr142-0011392117717294]). This label however does not suit PRR parties and movements in Eastern Europe very well, since they are more rooted in territorial revisionism and perceived threats from ethnic minorities, such as the Roma ([@bibr35-0011392117717294]; [@bibr102-0011392117717294]). Compared with Western Europe, the link between anti-immigration attitudes and PRR voting is significantly weaker in post-communist Europe ([@bibr13-0011392117717294]).

According to [@bibr104-0011392117717294] influential definition, two additional features characterize the PRR family: populism and authoritarianism. PRR groups share their populist, anti-establishment rhetoric ([@bibr40-0011392117717294]; [@bibr79-0011392117717294]; [@bibr116-0011392117717294]). Populism is a communication style or 'thin' ideology that adds a second division between 'us' and 'them': it pits the 'pure people' against the untrustworthy 'corrupt elite' ([@bibr104-0011392117717294]).

Second, authoritarianism implies stressing themes like law and order and traditional values. Relatedly, PRR groups favour strong leaders who reflect 'the will of the people' ([@bibr77-0011392117717294]). However, there seems no consistent empirical relationship between authoritarian attitudes and PRR party preference in Western Europe ([@bibr49-0011392117717294]). Traits such as conformism or submission to traditional authority are also at odds with the picture painted of far-right social movement activists ([@bibr87-0011392117717294]). As a matter of fact, PRR movements often challenge existing authority ([@bibr70-0011392117717294]).

In a nutshell, substantial progress has been made in three respects. First, scholars have diverted their attention away from trivializing definitional debates about what right-wing radicalism or populism really 'is'. Instead, they have increasingly focused on more informative discussions about theories and hypotheses. Second, scholars increasingly focus on actually measuring the ideological characteristics and policy stances of both PRR and mainstream parties ([@bibr53-0011392117717294]; [@bibr76-0011392117717294]; [@bibr123-0011392117717294]). As a corollary, most scholars have abandoned reasoning in clear-cut categories. A strict 'either--or' logic ([@bibr104-0011392117717294]; [@bibr143-0011392117717294]) has been replaced by the argument that populism is more a 'matter of degree' ([@bibr114-0011392117717294]). Likewise, parties can position themselves somewhere on the left--right or cosmopolitan--nativist dimension ([@bibr7-0011392117717294]; [@bibr145-0011392117717294]).

Nevertheless, for many research questions requiring case selection it is still necessary to delineate which ones deserve the label PRR and which ones not. Relying on expert surveys, [@bibr145-0011392117717294] for instance qualifies parties that score higher than 8 on a 10-point left--right scale (it is unclear what a position on this scale exactly signifies) and an immigration restriction scale as 'far right' and 'anti-immigration', respectively. [@bibr77-0011392117717294] use a similar method with a cultural position scale, which includes promoting traditional values, nationalism, law and order, and opposition to multiculturalism.

[@bibr145-0011392117717294]: 295) noted that, despite conceptual unclarity, 'every researcher seems to know which objects to study'. This however seems less obvious when we study post-communist Europe. Until recently, scholars have often ignored this region ([@bibr101-0011392117717294], [@bibr102-0011392117717294]; [@bibr117-0011392117717294]; [@bibr119-0011392117717294]). Due to its more fluid party systems, it is generally more difficult to distinguish the political establishment from (populist) outsiders challenging it ([@bibr143-0011392117717294]). Mainstream parties and discourses are often more radicalized than in Western Europe ([@bibr102-0011392117717294]). Particularly Law and Justice (PiS) in Poland and Fidesz in Hungary illustrate this difficulty. [@bibr102-0011392117717294]: 124) considers them 'right-wing populist with programmatic elements of radical right', since they remain ideologically more diverse than the PRR family. Nevertheless, these two parties feature prominently in debates about liberal democracy being undermined by right-wing populism. Expert surveys show that PiS and Fidesz have more radical positions than some Western European PRR parties ([@bibr77-0011392117717294]).

Explanations for failures and successes: Demand- and supply-side approaches {#section3-0011392117717294}
===========================================================================

Explanations for the rise and fortunes of PRR parties and movements are usually grouped into two approaches, demand-side and supply-side: one focusing on grievances and one on political constraints and opportunities ([@bibr91-0011392117717294]; [@bibr104-0011392117717294]; [@bibr129-0011392117717294]). These two approaches should be viewed as complementary, rather than competing theories ([@bibr139-0011392117717294]). Supply-side factors can be further divided into internal factors ([@bibr47-0011392117717294]; [@bibr111-0011392117717294]), like organizational characteristics ([@bibr17-0011392117717294]; [@bibr48-0011392117717294]), and external factors, such as institutional frameworks and elite responses ([@bibr21-0011392117717294]; [@bibr86-0011392117717294]).

The socio-demographic characteristics and attitudes of radical right supporters have been extensively investigated ([@bibr19-0011392117717294]; [@bibr63-0011392117717294]; [@bibr139-0011392117717294]). More recent studies also include Eastern European countries ([@bibr13-0011392117717294]; [@bibr77-0011392117717294]; [@bibr153-0011392117717294]). The findings can be summarized into two general claims. First, protest is not 'unideological', but clearly directed against policies concerning immigration, integration and law and order ([@bibr51-0011392117717294]; [@bibr137-0011392117717294]). Voting for PRR parties seems largely motivated by ideological and pragmatic considerations, just like voting for other parties ([@bibr141-0011392117717294]). These motivations stem from perceived loss of culture and economic deprivation, although citizens perhaps do not clearly distinguish between cultural and economic grievances ([@bibr63-0011392117717294]). Moreover, characteristics of followers might differ across contexts. For instance, lower-educated people are generally the 'usual suspects', but the constituency of Jobbik certainly does not consist of the 'losers' of the transition: the young and higher educated are more likely to support this party ([@bibr92-0011392117717294]).

Alternatively, voters for PRR parties are sometimes characterized as irrational and alienated, seemingly unconnected to any particular values or policy preferences. However, social isolation is not related to PRR voting, either in Western or Eastern Europe ([@bibr130-0011392117717294]; [@bibr159-0011392117717294]). In a similar vein, [@bibr87-0011392117717294]: 267) conclude that radical right activists are socially integrated and appear as 'perfectly normal people' (cf. [@bibr29-0011392117717294]: 271).

Second, it has become clear that a complete and satisfying explanation for PRR popularity needs to go beyond the demand-side model. It fails to explain short-term fluctuations within countries or large differences between otherwise mostly similar countries ([@bibr43-0011392117717294]; [@bibr111-0011392117717294]). For instance, Austria, where the FPÖ has enjoyed considerable successes, is hardly more deprived than Germany, where the PRR is weak. Similarly, comparing the divergent fortunes of the Walloon Front National and Flemish VB, it is hard to imagine that immigration and unemployment have created significantly larger electoral demands for the radical right in Flanders compared to the Walloon region ([@bibr19-0011392117717294]).

The external supply-side: Political constraints and opportunities {#section4-0011392117717294}
=================================================================

According to external supply-side explanations, successful mobilization is the result of constraints and opportunities that the political-institutional context offers, most importantly the electoral system and the 'political space' left open by political competitors. Several researchers have convincingly shown that such factors matter, both for the action repertoire that PRR actors adopt ([@bibr91-0011392117717294]) and their electoral performances ([@bibr18-0011392117717294]; [@bibr21-0011392117717294]; [@bibr40-0011392117717294]; [@bibr96-0011392117717294]; [@bibr111-0011392117717294]; [@bibr142-0011392117717294]).

Institutional framework {#section5-0011392117717294}
-----------------------

Several works have assessed whether the level of federalism and the electoral system affect the popularity of the PRR ([@bibr39-0011392117717294]; [@bibr66-0011392117717294]; [@bibr136-0011392117717294]; [@bibr149-0011392117717294]). According to [@bibr85-0011392117717294]: 1193), the general lesson is that the impact of institutional effects on PRR party strength is modest. Proportional electoral systems are conducive to the entrance or success of new parties ([@bibr138-0011392117717294]), but findings regarding radical parties in particular have been mixed ([@bibr40-0011392117717294]; [@bibr62-0011392117717294]; [@bibr81-0011392117717294]; [@bibr111-0011392117717294]; [@bibr142-0011392117717294]). Electoral thresholds may induce potential radical right voters to support mainstream parties when they perceive their favourite party to be too weak to overcome the barrier to entry ([@bibr61-0011392117717294]). Clearly, the institutional configuration most unfavourable for newcomers exists in Britain ([@bibr85-0011392117717294]). That the British PRR has 'failed' is often attributed to the majoritarian electoral system ([@bibr83-0011392117717294]).

Political space {#section6-0011392117717294}
---------------

The emergence and rise of the PRR is affected by the positioning of the political parties within the policy space ([@bibr86-0011392117717294]). Political space refers to the degree to which mainstream parties (or moderate-right parties in particular) occupy the electoral terrain of the radical right. When they ideologically converge, they leave a 'gap' in the electoral market. [@bibr94-0011392117717294], [@bibr93-0011392117717294]) argue that where established parties follow a moderate course in favour of the 'winners' of globalization, they provide an opportunity for the creation of parties that mobilize the 'losers'. Several studies indeed found that ideological convergence between mainstream parties benefited the entrance or success of radical new parties ([@bibr21-0011392117717294]; [@bibr40-0011392117717294]; [@bibr111-0011392117717294]; but see [@bibr149-0011392117717294]).

We need to distinguish issue positions from issue salience. Mainstream parties have three strategies at their disposal: remain silent on the particular issue (dismissive), distance itself from nativist viewpoints (adversarial), or adopt a similar position (accommodative). [@bibr99-0011392117717294] argues that issue salience will only enhance PRR support if mainstream parties declare hostility toward the niche party's policy position. If mainstream parties employ accommodative tactics, electoral support for PRR contenders will diminish. Many scholars similarly argue that the PRR loses out when mainstream parties adopt restrictive positions on immigration ([@bibr21-0011392117717294]; [@bibr86-0011392117717294]). This strategy may however backfire ([@bibr23-0011392117717294]). [@bibr51-0011392117717294]: 423) for instance notes that mainstream parties 'play with fire' when they adopt anti-immigrant themes, because it legitimizes the agenda of the PRR.

Political space is measured in different ways, for different time periods. Therefore, the results of studies on the effect of the political agenda of other parties on the popularity of PRR challengers show a mixed picture. For instance, using Eurobarometer surveys (1980--2002) and party statements on internationalism, multiculturalism, national lifestyle and law and order from the Comparative Manifestos Project (CMP), [@bibr18-0011392117717294]; see also [@bibr21-0011392117717294]) found that the ideological position of the established moderate-right party (labelled 'toughness') had no significant effect on cross-national differences in support for the PRR. On the other hand, saliency, the relative amount of these statements in the manifestos of all established parties, had a positive impact on levels of PRR support.

In contrast, [@bibr142-0011392117717294] found that PRR parties are more successful when the moderate-right occupies a more centrist position on a general left--right scale. They relied on the European Elections Studies data (1989--1999) and used respondents' perceptions to measure party positions. And in this case, the extent to which the anti-immigration parties' mainstream competitor emphasized the core issue of the radical right was insignificant, although they measured saliency similarly to Arzheimer (using the CMP data) by selecting the issues crime, negative references to multiculturalism and positive references to 'the national way of life'.

The role of the media environment {#section7-0011392117717294}
---------------------------------

The above-mentioned contradiction could perhaps be solved when we complement the political space approach with the notion that opportunities and constraints need to become publicly visible in order to become relevant ([@bibr90-0011392117717294]). Populist movements rely heavily on media, because they often lack sufficient organizational and financial means to get their message across to potential adherents. The controversial, tabloid-style language of its leaders flourishes in a 'media logic' in which newsworthiness is increasingly based on conflicts and scandals ([@bibr1-0011392117717294]; [@bibr41-0011392117717294]).

Media-related independent variables can be grouped into (1) attention for issues associated with the PRR and (2) attention for PRR actors. Regarding the first, the empirical findings indicate that news coverage on issues that are 'owned' by PRR parties -- immigration issues and law and order -- enhances the electoral attractiveness of these parties ([@bibr32-0011392117717294]; [@bibr118-0011392117717294]; [@bibr151-0011392117717294]).

Several researchers have also investigated the effect of news coverage on PRR actors ([@bibr95-0011392117717294]; [@bibr150-0011392117717294]). There are many indications that the 'media factor' benefits PRR groups. For example, the French FN made its electoral breakthrough in 1984 only after Jean-Marie Le Pen was given access to state television ([@bibr52-0011392117717294]; [@bibr55-0011392117717294]). Another example is the 'pro-Haider line' of the *Kronen Zeitung*, Austria's largest newspaper ([@bibr16-0011392117717294]).

Scholars have differentiated between coverage for PRR speakers and responses of other actors, between positive and negative coverage ([@bibr33-0011392117717294]; [@bibr89-0011392117717294]; [@bibr109-0011392117717294]), and between the visibility of leaders and parties ([@bibr150-0011392117717294]). Research shows that PRR leaders and parties clearly profit from media prominence ([@bibr33-0011392117717294]; [@bibr42-0011392117717294]; [@bibr89-0011392117717294]). [@bibr150-0011392117717294] find that party visibility enhanced electoral support for five of the six anti-immigrant parties they investigated, namely VB, Party for Freedom (PVV), Republikaner, National Democratic Party for Germany (NPD) and German People's Union (DVU). The Dutch Centre Democrats (CD) was the one exception.

[@bibr109-0011392117717294] study on the CD showed two opposite effects: negative publicity was electorally harmful, but at the same time it increased media visibility. Support for the party decreased when it achieved media access because the outright racist claims of its leader Hans Janmaat provoked harsh criticism. But when trying to achieve media visibility, it turned out that 'any publicity is good publicity'. This nuances the claim of [@bibr135-0011392117717294] that any media coverage is advantageous for political figures: it enhances their visibility, but not necessarily implies public legitimation. The difficulty is thus to find the right balance between newsworthiness and electoral credibility. Populist leaders face a trade-off between 'being somewhat unusual and provocative ... (in order to guarantee newsworthiness and therefore prominence)' and being 'taken seriously as a party' ([@bibr33-0011392117717294]: 143).

Repression, cordon sanitaire {#section8-0011392117717294}
----------------------------

This brings us to the role of repression and legal measures, such as bans and prosecutions. A similar logic applies here: the effect of repression is conditional. Its effects may depend on the politician or group targeted and the situation they are in. Another relevant factor is the nature of the statements in question ([@bibr147-0011392117717294]). For instance, the hate-speech charges pressed on Geert Wilders in 2009 considerably boosted electoral support for his party ([@bibr147-0011392117717294]). Wilders had already established himself as a powerful politician when it was decided that he was to stand trial.

The impact of prosecution is very different for politicians and groups on the fringe. When movement activists are faced with legal and social sanctions (e.g. public disapproval and exclusion), protesting is a costly business and the ability to attract a wider support-base is undermined. Countries differ significantly in laws regulating the Internet, and thus how favourable a national context is for the online activities of radical right-wing groups ([@bibr37-0011392117717294]).

In addition to legal measures, PRR parties sometimes suffer political exclusion in the form of a refusal by other parties to cooperate with them, a so-called cordon sanitaire ([@bibr7-0011392117717294]). It is however not clear whether it is an effective strategy if the purpose is to undermine electoral support. Results on the effects of exclusion on electoral outcomes of PRR parties are mixed ([@bibr115-0011392117717294]; [@bibr148-0011392117717294]).

Internal supply-side factors: Characteristics of the PRR {#section9-0011392117717294}
========================================================

From an internal supply-side perspective, we cannot reduce PRR parties and movements to the passive consequences of socio-economic processes and external political conditions. Instead, they are largely shapers of their own fates ([@bibr40-0011392117717294]; [@bibr64-0011392117717294]; [@bibr73-0011392117717294]; [@bibr104-0011392117717294]). We distinguish two factors: ideology and organizational structure, including leadership ([@bibr40-0011392117717294]; [@bibr64-0011392117717294]).

The role of ideology {#section10-0011392117717294}
--------------------

What parties most importantly can achieve through their own actions is to find a beneficial position in the policy space. [@bibr86-0011392117717294] claimed that the ideological 'winning formula' combines culturally exclusionist/authoritarian positions with liberal pro-market positions. However, the position that is said to make the PRR successful has changed over time ([@bibr45-0011392117717294]; [@bibr84-0011392117717294]). The PRR has abandoned right-wing economic stances ([@bibr53-0011392117717294]) and adopted protectionism ([@bibr131-0011392117717294]) and welfare chauvinism ([@bibr112-0011392117717294]).

[@bibr40-0011392117717294] demonstrated a relation between the type of ideology parties employ and their success: more extreme parties are less successful. She encountered some notable exceptions. The Dutch CD was for instance a deviant case: most of the party's ideological counterparts have flourished, like in Austria (FPÖ), France (FN) and Belgium (VB). The ideological character does not only have direct effects on the fortunes of parties, it also interacts with other explanatory factors. [@bibr62-0011392117717294] found that increasing unemployment and high levels of immigration only yield more electoral success for populist radical right parties, but not for the ones that were labelled as 'neo-fascist'. Despite these two examples, to date, research on such interactions and ideological positioning is relatively scarce ([@bibr63-0011392117717294]). Instead of figuring as an explanatory factor, party ideology has played a more dominant role in delimiting the dependent variable.

In any case, despite their common nativist stance as their unique selling point, PRR groups are distinct in their ideological character and framing, and these differences have crucial consequences in terms of their fortunes. The 'master frame' (combining nativism with populism) needs to be modified to the particular national context in which these groups operate ([@bibr36-0011392117717294]; [@bibr128-0011392117717294]). Scholars have observed that far-right orientations have been adapted. In particular, anti-Semitism has been replaced by Islamophobia ([@bibr156-0011392117717294]). In Scandinavia and the Netherlands, 'new' PRR parties have stressed progressiveness -- liberty, women's rights, individualism -- against reactionary authoritarian standpoints ([@bibr44-0011392117717294]; [@bibr128-0011392117717294]). In a similar vein, anti-Islam movements such as the English Defence League (EDL) and the Identitarian movement (France) have distanced themselves from anti-Semitism and racism ([@bibr57-0011392117717294]).

Organizational arguments and leadership {#section11-0011392117717294}
---------------------------------------

Besides ideology, organizational characteristics such as a lack of financial resources, appealing leadership and shortfall of active membership have frequently been proposed as pivotal factors for the performances of PRR parties and movements ([@bibr17-0011392117717294]). Lack of coherence of party organizations and intra-party conflicts have often hampered PRR parties ([@bibr69-0011392117717294]).

However, organizational characteristics that are supposedly beneficial or indispensable often do not seem to be relevant in order to account for the impressive performance of populist challengers. As pointed out earlier, many leaders rely almost entirely on media attention, and successful trajectories often illustrate how media visibility can compensate for organizational weaknesses ([@bibr55-0011392117717294]; [@bibr98-0011392117717294]). The growth of membership and improvement of an organization often lag behind success, instead of the other way around: media attention and electoral support are first successfully mobilized, then organizational and financial resources follow. In a review article on party organization effects, [@bibr55-0011392117717294]: 219) states that organizational arguments 'would need to carefully trace the evolution of party organisations to establish the direction of causality'. His evidence from the French FN indicates that organizational growth seems the consequence rather than the cause of electoral success, especially during the earlier stages of development. [@bibr48-0011392117717294] identified a 'circle of organisational weakness': weak organizations (like the Dutch CD) remained weak, whereas, in contrast, strong organizations (like VB in Belgium) became stronger over time. In sum, organizational resources seem often both a cause and a result of success. As a genuinely 'independent variable', organizational strength might be more important to explain the persistence of parties after their initial breakthrough ([@bibr54-0011392117717294], [@bibr55-0011392117717294]).

Charismatic leadership is another prominent supply-side explanation in the academic literature ([@bibr52-0011392117717294]; [@bibr96-0011392117717294]). However, this explanation suffers from circular reasoning ([@bibr140-0011392117717294]; [@bibr142-0011392117717294]). Charisma is a legitimization for those who appear to be the 'heroes of a war' and can as suddenly vanish as it appears. If leaders are unsuccessful, charismatic authority can quickly disappear. [@bibr152-0011392117717294] illustrates this by noting that even Chinese monarchs could sometimes lose their status as 'sons of heaven' because of misfortune, such as defeat in war, floods or drought. To conclude, outstanding charismatic appeal is better seen as an emergent situational characteristic, rather than attributed to the skills and personality of the leader concerned.

Consequences of PRR party and movement success {#section12-0011392117717294}
==============================================

In addition to the causes of PRR fortunes, scholars have increasingly investigated the consequences of the emergence and rise of PRR parties and movements ([@bibr105-0011392117717294]; [@bibr126-0011392117717294]). It is often stated that radical right populism endangers some of the constitutional foundations of liberal democracies: pluralism and the protection of minorities ([@bibr3-0011392117717294]; [@bibr27-0011392117717294]; [@bibr104-0011392117717294]).

At the same time, however, scholars agree that it distinguishes itself from political extremism, in the sense that PRR supporters and activists respect democracy, whereas extremist groups are hostile to democratic political processes ([@bibr28-0011392117717294]; [@bibr100-0011392117717294]; [@bibr129-0011392117717294]). PRR parties could actually correct democratic deficiencies by speaking to a large group of citizens disillusioned with mainstream politicians ([@bibr108-0011392117717294]). Citizens feel that there is someone who 'listened to their grievances' ([@bibr79-0011392117717294]) and enables them to become passionately, rather than rationally, involved in politics ([@bibr103-0011392117717294]).

The question of whether there is a relationship between PRR successes and various outcomes associated with the quality of democracy (such as voter turnout) can be empirically tested ([@bibr74-0011392117717294]). Therefore, and related to the observation that the PRR has assumed more stable positions within the party system ([@bibr46-0011392117717294]; [@bibr158-0011392117717294]), we have witnessed a rise in studies on the impact of PRR success on several domains, including the party system ([@bibr106-0011392117717294]) and media debate ([@bibr122-0011392117717294]). We restrict ourselves here to the impact on policies, on PRR groups themselves and on the public. Studies generally focus on Western Europe; despite some exceptions, evidence for the impact of the PRR is largely absent from the literature on the East European radical right ([@bibr102-0011392117717294]).

Policies and mainstream party positions {#section13-0011392117717294}
---------------------------------------

Given the PRR's alleged threatening effect on the position and rights of immigrants, it comes as no surprise that scholars have paid attention to the extent to which the PRR was successful in implementing policies derived from its nativist, anti-immigration ideology. Scholars have investigated whether governments that included PRR members introduced tougher policies on immigration and integration ([@bibr4-0011392117717294]; [@bibr68-0011392117717294]; [@bibr97-0011392117717294]; [@bibr157-0011392117717294]). These studies generally find no or a limited impact of the PRR on the policies implemented. For instance, [@bibr4-0011392117717294] concludes on the basis of a comparative analysis of the immigration and integration output of 27 cabinets in nine countries (1996--2010) that when the PRR is in office, cabinets generally introduce stricter immigration and integration legislation than centre(-left) cabinets. Yet, centre-right cabinets that do *not* include a PRR are similar in terms of strictness of immigration policy as those including a PRR. Apparently, the difficulties these parties face in adapting to public office hinder their effectiveness to implement stricter policies ([@bibr4-0011392117717294]; cf. [@bibr146-0011392117717294]). The finding of [@bibr158-0011392117717294] that the Austrian Freedom Party and Italian Lega Nord (LN) have been instrumental in passing more restrictive immigration policy may thus be more due to the performance of the conservative mainstream parties that cooperate with them than because of the performance of the PRR itself (cf. [@bibr68-0011392117717294]).

The PRR could also influence policy making *indirectly*, via its impact on other parties' positions ([@bibr132-0011392117717294]). As such, scholars have investigated whether the PRR's success influences the policy positions on immigration, multiculturalism, populism, law and order, and more style-related issues, such as anti-establishment rhetoric ([@bibr23-0011392117717294]; [@bibr24-0011392117717294]; [@bibr67-0011392117717294]; [@bibr76-0011392117717294]; [@bibr124-0011392117717294]; [@bibr144-0011392117717294]; [@bibr155-0011392117717294]). To study these effects, scholars used either expert surveys (e.g. [@bibr74-0011392117717294]; [@bibr144-0011392117717294]), or assessed the salience of typical PRR issues in party manifestos (e.g. [@bibr14-0011392117717294]).

The results of these studies can be easily summarized: the PRR affects the stances of mainstream parties on immigration and integration issues, but not on other issues. Based on various expert surveys, [@bibr144-0011392117717294] concluded that other political parties have generally become more restrictive with respect to immigration and integration due to the PRR's success. Using manifesto data, [@bibr67-0011392117717294] and [@bibr5-0011392117717294] found similar effects. More specifically, a fine-grained manifesto content analysis (1989--2011) by [@bibr5-0011392117717294] shows that mainly Liberals were tempted to co-opt far-right positions, whereas Social Democrats are not affected -- or at least their reaction is far from uniform ([@bibr24-0011392117717294]). [@bibr67-0011392117717294]: 1) shows that left-wing parties only become less multicultural 'when the opinion of party supporters on foreigners becomes more negative or when the parties lost more votes in the previous election than their opponent right-wing mainstream parties did'.

With regard to other issues, such as populism and law and order, mainstream parties seem to hold to their original ideological position ([@bibr24-0011392117717294]). On the basis of manifesto data ([@bibr124-0011392117717294]) and expert surveys ([@bibr76-0011392117717294]), scholars do not find that mainstream parties have become more populist and authoritarian.

To conclude, PRRs have an indirect, but modest influence on policy outcomes. This impact is generally limited to the issue of immigration and integration ([@bibr105-0011392117717294]). Specifically mainstream right-wing parties employ a convergence strategy that puts them ideologically closer to the PRR ([@bibr99-0011392117717294]; [@bibr155-0011392117717294]). However, mainstream right parties are often inclined to move toward stricter immigration policy anyway, independently of PRR successes ([@bibr5-0011392117717294]; [@bibr14-0011392117717294]; [@bibr23-0011392117717294]).

Consequence for PRR parties/movements {#section14-0011392117717294}
-------------------------------------

There is a growing scholarship on how PRR successes affect these groups themselves. Most importantly, what effect does the inclusion into a governing coalition have on parties, both in terms of their ideological positions and their electoral success ([@bibr6-0011392117717294]; [@bibr7-0011392117717294]; [@bibr10-0011392117717294]; [@bibr146-0011392117717294])? [@bibr68-0011392117717294] argued that right-wing populist parties thrive in opposition, but have trouble with actually participating in a government. He argued that governing leads to moderation and hence to electoral losses. In contrast, [@bibr105-0011392117717294] argues that they will uphold their oppositional image and radical rhetoric, to avoid the risk of being perceived as part of 'the corrupt elite'.

Although there are several case studies, systematic tests of the so-called inclusion-moderation thesis are scarce ([@bibr7-0011392117717294]). [@bibr9-0011392117717294], [@bibr10-0011392117717294]) dismiss the received wisdom that populist parties have inherent problems with assuming power. Their case studies of three parties in Italy and Switzerland -- Popolo della Libertà (PDL), LN and Schweizerische Volkspartei (SVP) -- show that PRR parties can keep 'one foot in and one foot out' of government: they can thrive and maintain radical positions after taking up government responsibility (cf. [@bibr59-0011392117717294]). Likewise, an extensive recent study of [@bibr7-0011392117717294] concludes that there is no trend toward mainstreaming of Western European PRR parties when it comes to positions on their core issues immigration and integration, European integration and authoritarianism. Overall, there is thus no indication that PRR parties are becoming less radical.

Citizens' attitudes and behaviour {#section15-0011392117717294}
---------------------------------

Third, the PRR's emergence and success might affect citizens, in the sense that they shift their views toward more anti-immigration and authoritarian positions, or change their political behaviour ([@bibr15-0011392117717294]; [@bibr30-0011392117717294]; [@bibr50-0011392117717294]; [@bibr74-0011392117717294]; [@bibr78-0011392117717294]; [@bibr133-0011392117717294]; [@bibr134-0011392117717294]; [@bibr154-0011392117717294]). PRR groups can also make some issues more salient ([@bibr23-0011392117717294]; [@bibr78-0011392117717294]).

Studies on the impact of PRR success on immigration attitudes provide a mixed picture ([@bibr50-0011392117717294]; [@bibr133-0011392117717294]; [@bibr134-0011392117717294]). Some conclude that successful and visible PRR parties undermine support for multiculturalism ([@bibr30-0011392117717294]), whereas others find no effects. An extensive recent study, based on European Social Survey data (2002--2012), showed that PRR parties have not driven anti-immigration attitudes in Europe ([@bibr31-0011392117717294]). The main difficulty is the lack of longitudinal studies, modelling the attitudinal consequences of PRR success over time. Evidence based on German and Dutch panel data showed that perceptions of threatened group interests *precipitate* rather than *follow* citizens' preferences for PRR parties ([@bibr25-0011392117717294]).

Regarding political involvement and trust, one might expect that PRR parties foster voter turnout because they reintroduce electoral competition and trigger politically disengaged people to become actively or passionately involved in politics ([@bibr82-0011392117717294]; [@bibr103-0011392117717294]). For instance, [@bibr56-0011392117717294] concludes that the Austrian FPÖ addressed issues neglected by other parties, such as immigration and integration. Accordingly, over the period 1996--2001, the party gave voice to an apolitical part of the electorate, who increasingly felt that politicians listened to them.

However, based on a Dutch six-wave panel study (2008--2013), [@bibr125-0011392117717294] find that the popularity of populist parties fuels political discontent, rather than dampens it. In the same vein, based on an analysis of 33 European countries in the period 2002--2012, [@bibr75-0011392117717294] find there is no general positive influence of the PRR's popularity on electoral turnout. Yet, the Western European PRR encourages some social groups to turn out for national elections. These groups are, however, people who are actually repelled by them: the more highly educated and politically interested are more inclined to 'keep the rascals out'. To conclude, to speak of the PRR as 'corrective of democracy' seems -- in terms of increasing electoral turnout or political satisfaction -- a misunderstanding.

Another interesting question is how institutionalized and non-institutionalized forms of political participation are related. [@bibr71-0011392117717294] finds that the more successful the populist radical right is in electoral terms, the more it tends to abstain from protest activities. Furthermore, Koopmans' (1996) cross-national comparison showed an inverse relation between the success of PRR parties and the incidence of racist violence. Access to political power in a number of Western European countries over the past years might have contributed to less right-wing violence ([@bibr120-0011392117717294]). Hence, the electoral channel seems to effectively substitute for street activity and violence (see [@bibr91-0011392117717294]). However, a recent study comparing the German *Bundesländer* found a positive relation between PRR voting and xenophobic violence ([@bibr80-0011392117717294]).

Particularly in the United Kingdom and Germany, xenophobic sentiments can hardly be canalized through the electoral channel. It therefore should perhaps not come as a surprise that both countries have experiences with large-scale street movements. The rise of EDL and Britain First is a corollary of the decay of the British National Party ([@bibr11-0011392117717294]; [@bibr12-0011392117717294]). The EDL 'offered a more attractive and confrontational alternative to perennial failure at the ballot box' ([@bibr58-0011392117717294]: 8). The movement relied heavily on social media to get its message across and recruit supporters ([@bibr34-0011392117717294]).

In sum, a weak or fragmented party sector corresponds with a strong movement sector or environment of violence ([@bibr100-0011392117717294]). It remains to be seen whether UKIP (in the UK) and Alternative for Germany (AfD) will change this picture in the future. [@bibr113-0011392117717294] conclude that the number of Pegida protesters has shrunk since the AfD has increasingly succeeded to put their grievances on the political agenda. Although several AfD politicians have distanced themselves from Pegida ([@bibr60-0011392117717294]), a survey showed that 57% of the Pegida demonstrators in Dresden would vote for AfD, and only about 4--5% for NPD ([@bibr121-0011392117717294]).

Future directions: How to proceed? {#section16-0011392117717294}
==================================

We conclude this review with a discussion of possible avenues for future research. Concerning research questions, scholars need to pay more attention to the temporal dimension of political contention ([@bibr63-0011392117717294]). Remarkably, whereas cross-national comparisons have become commonplace, comparisons in time are still scarce ([@bibr54-0011392117717294]; [@bibr85-0011392117717294]). A dynamic view could reveal whether explanations for and consequences of PRR parties and movements change during their trajectory. For instance, before groups pass the 'threshold of relevance' ([@bibr40-0011392117717294]; [@bibr54-0011392117717294]) -- i.e. are big enough to matter -- organizational attributes might have no effect on their performance. And once populist outsiders have established themselves as credible alternatives, traditional parties may not win back electoral support if they adopt similar agendas ([@bibr143-0011392117717294]). Likewise, the impact of government responsibility depends on how long parties exist and whether they have institutionalized (De Lange and [@bibr17-0011392117717294]).

Cross-national comparisons focus mainly on the PRR's electoral strength. The strength of social movements and the interaction between electoral politics and other forms of political mobilization, including street protests and racist violence, have received relatively little attention. There are only a few comparative overviews of the non-party sector ([@bibr100-0011392117717294]). Individual-level research is needed on the question whether the electoral channel effectively substitutes for street activity ([@bibr71-0011392117717294]; [@bibr88-0011392117717294]). To what extent do people refrain from using non-parliamentary means to voice their grievances about multiculturalism and immigration, due to electoral successes or government inclusion of PRR parties ([@bibr100-0011392117717294])? Again, a dynamic perspective is important: over time, movements can turn into political parties, and parties can engage in street demonstrations when they face political obstruction.

This brings us to future avenues for theoretical progress. Both PRR parties and movements and its competitors/opponents can adjust their action repertoire and ideology over time, and continually respond to what other agents are doing, which is insufficiently addressed by static, spatial comparisons. Future scholarship could theorize more from such an evolutionary perspective. We should elaborate more sophisticated behavioural models of party strategies ([@bibr85-0011392117717294]). We should not only try to identify a certain policy package that 'works' beneficially. In addition, we need to reveal the mechanism by which parties are able or inclined to arrive at successful positions over time. Only a few accounts of far-right populism clearly explicate why or how successful populist leaders are able to find 'successful positions' and why most other attempts fail to do so ([@bibr110-0011392117717294]).

In terms of confronting theories with empirical evidence, future studies could be enriched by greater attention to PRR parties and movements' presence on the Internet. The current debate on the role of the Internet is characterized by much theoretical speculation; we know little about how these groups use the Internet for political communication and mobilization ([@bibr37-0011392117717294]). Future work in this field could make progress in two ways. To date, to assess where PRR groups stand, scholars mainly rely on manifestos ([@bibr7-0011392117717294]; [@bibr53-0011392117717294]), expert surveys ([@bibr76-0011392117717294]) and traditional media ([@bibr94-0011392117717294]). These methods could be supplemented with sources that are widely consumed by citizens (few people actually read party manifestos) and controlled by PRR actors themselves (media coverage might be biased), namely social media. Second, social media analyses could also enrich our understanding of supporters and sympathizers, in addition to surveys or interviews. For instance, [@bibr20-0011392117717294] concludes that the German AfD does not qualify as either nativist or populist, but statements of Facebook followers hint at more radical currents among its supporters. The topics that people devoted most attention to (Islam and immigration) were hardly mentioned in AfD's own messages.

To conclude, the scholarship on the populist radical right has become a 'minor industry' ([@bibr19-0011392117717294]: 35), but there are still important gaps and challenges. In addition to the ample static country-comparisons, upcoming studies could pay more attention to the fact that both PRR actors and its environment are dynamic over time. They could also make progress by thereby investigating the interplay between the electoral channel and all other types of political mobilization, such as demonstrations. Since the stances and supporters of street movements are difficult to investigate with conventional methods such as surveys and manifesto coding, scholars could rely more on social media data.
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